Lacan webpages banner

Il n’y a pas de rapport sexuel:
The Irresolvability of the Gadamer-Habermas Debate

WILLIAM J. URBAN

Gadamer and the 'Not-all' of Philosophical Hermeneutics

Gadamer's most sustained discussion of tradition occurs in the middle of Part II of Truth and Method in a section entitled 'The Rehabilitation of Authority and Tradition.' But anyone looking for a concise definition of tradition will soon be disappointed. Perhaps the closest we get to a declarative statement is when we are told that tradition is 'precisely' the ground of the validity of morals and moreover, that its own ground lies beyond reason. (Gadamer 2003: 280–1) Not exactly the model of clarity, but Gadamer himself readily admits that if the concept of tradition was once historically understood, today it has become ambiguous. A subsequent section on time further complicates matters by speaking of temporal distance not as an obstacle but 'as a positive and productive condition,' whereas the following section introduces the spatial metaphor of 'horizon' which again adds to the difficulty, for while a horizon limits the subject of tradition, it nevertheless somehow allows him 'to see beyond it.' (ibid 297, 302) So again, what exactly does Gadamer have in mind with regards to tradition, the element of which he says should 'be given its full value?' (ibid 282) We can capture his conflicting claims by posing the question in the following form, which structurally follows Kant's first antinomy:

Thesis: Tradition is limited with respect to time and space.
Antithesis: Tradition has no such limits, but is infinite with respect to time and space.

Insofar as these two propositions contradict each other, a choice must be made. Now let us imagine how Gadamer might proceed. Certainly he would not opt for the thesis, as it is falsified by the antithetical claim that '[t]radition is not simply a permanent precondition' as the examples of the timeless significance of the classical and of the interminable historical effect of every situation make clear. (ibid 293, 288, 301) But certainly not the antithesis either, as it is falsified by the thetic claim that tradition is subject to the temporal and spatial constraints of the 'fore-conception of completeness' and of the possibility of a 'fusion of horizons' which supersedes any projected historical horizon superimposed upon continuing tradition. (ibid 293–4, 306–7) The problem here is that since the arguments for each proposition succeed in demonstrating the falsity of the other, the truth of neither can be established once and for all. Yet if Gadamer is not to be dismissed as a skeptic but rather one who genuinely seeks the truth (as the very title of his opus suggests), we must inquire into how philosophical hermeneutics extricates itself from this logical bind.

Our contention is that Gadamer would resolve the dilemma in a Kantian manner by effectively declaring that such propositions are not contradictory but contraries,5 thereby granting him the right to refuse choosing between the two false propositions. We thus read his statement that 'the abstract antithesis between tradition and historical research... must be discarded'6 as registering an impatience with opposing abstract conceptions of an infinite, living tradition to those of a finite tradition qua object of study for historical science, since both approaches objectivate tradition and thereby extend to it an existence where none is possible. To explain this, we must examine the antinomy reason itself gets entangled in when it tries to grasp objects not of our possible experience and what is perhaps surprising is that it is Gadamer and not Habermas (that great champion of enlightenment) who demonstrates a better understanding of the nature of pure reason. Of course, Gadamer is always quick to point out how our being situated within traditions limits our freedom so that '[r]eason exists for us only in concrete, historical terms,' although he does occasionally concede to reason an awareness of its own limitations. (ibid 276, 279) Yet such concessions indicate his insight that reason really has no external limits: granted, historical phenomena arise and disclose themselves to us only through language, but the 'superior universality' of reason allows it to rise above the limitations of any language since '[l]anguage is the language of reason itself'. (ibid 401–2) These conflicting statements concerning reason suggest his implicit recognition that what limits reason is its very lack of a limit, for reason appears to be limited only by something whose very method of disclosure poses no external hindrance to it. To explain this, consider that for any phenomenon to become a possible object of historical experience, certain conditions must be met: the subject must possess particular prejudices, project the right horizon, orient himself just so to properly hear the question addressed to him from the past, etc. For Gadamer, this process is unending as we can never achieve an unconditional standpoint. But what should not be overlooked is the homology to the Kantian rule of reason which requires the subject to locate a possible object of experience through a progression or regression of phenomena in time and space in order to satisfy the formal conditions for that object's existence. Because of this, the very concept of tradition – as the absolute totality of all historical phenomena – is a contradiction in terms7 as its existence is utterly impossible. This is because the simultaneity of all historical phenomena precludes our grasp of it, the grasp of which can only be had through a succession of phenomena. Simply said, tradition cannot be an object at all.

Herein lies the rationale for Gadamer's ambiguous relation not only to the Enlightenment but to Romanticism as well. On the one hand, even though the Enlightenment is itself embedded in tradition, we must admit that tradition nevertheless poses no external obstacle to the former's use of reason. On the other, in no way can we consider philosophical hermeneutics an updated version of views held by those earlier revivers of tradition, for 'what determines the romantic understanding of tradition is its abstract opposition to the principle of enlightenment. Romanticism conceives of tradition as an antithesis to the freedom of reason and regards it as something historically given, like nature.' (ibid 281) As we just saw, tradition can be no existent historical object externally opposing the subject of reason for Gadamer, which is why he can unproblematically claim 'that there is no such unconditional antithesis between tradition and reason.' (ibid) In the end, by effectively viewing the above antinomy not as a set of mutually exclusive contradictory propositions, but as contraries which do not exhaust all possibilities, something is left behind upon which a rendering of a final judgment can be indefinitely deferred.8 Gadamer indexes the subject's relation to this something, to this 'truth of tradition,' with the neologism 'traditionalism.' (ibid)

Hence our initially formulated antinomy is to be rejected. This is so because the term tradition, by occupying the place of the subject in its propositions, assumes existence implicitly at the level of the antinomy's framework. In its stead must be formulated a new antinomy, one that captures the logic Gadamer actually employs when speaking of tradition and one which can be extended to other terms to better reflect his overall theoretical disposition. Recall that the above thesis was falsified by the antithetical claim that the essential attribute of tradition is its infinite nature due to its timeless significance and unending historical impact. But since the antithesis itself was falsified by arguments in support of the thesis, a logical impasse was reached which could only be overcome by showing the incoherency of the very concept of tradition and the absolute impossibility of its existence since tradition is not a possible object of historical experience. With this result, both the thesis and antithesis can now be dismissed and we do so in a manner which accentuates the Gadamerian conception of limitation. On the one hand, Gadamer recognizes that tradition cannot have any discernible temporal and spatial limits, for the 'fact is that in tradition there is always an element of freedom and of history itself. Even the most genuine and pure tradition does not persist because of the inertia of what once existed.' (ibid 281) Here is why the very word 'classical' means 'that the duration of a work's power to speak directly is fundamentally unlimited.' (ibid 290) These and other similar claims effectively tell us that 'Tradition has no limits with respect to time and space,' a statement which denies the thesis without making, as the antithesis does, a counter-assertion. Our experience of historical phenomena cannot have a limit, for this would require an exceptional phenomenon capable of stopping the progression or regression of historical experience that is not itself conditioned. Yet there can be no such phenomenal stopping point which is not also subject to that rule of reason which makes a phenomenon an object of historical experience. As Gadamer argues, since we always find ourselves within a situation, its very idea disallows us from taking an unconditioned position outside that situation so that 'throwing light on it is a task that is never entirely finished.' (ibid 301) Nor can the mere use of reason offer such a meta-position, for any limit 'set' by reason itself is by definition not an externally imposed limitation and implies at once that reason 'has already gone beyond that limit.' (ibid 343) Hence we arrive at a new thesis: There is no historical phenomenon that is not an object of possible experience.

On the other hand, simply because Gadamer recognizes the absence of a limit to the set of historical phenomena does not necessitate he conceive the progression of these phenomena as an infinite series, as the antithesis might have it. Rather, the logic here should compel him to recognize their essential finitude and he does just that: 'For we are guided by the hermeneutical phenomenon; and its ground, which determines everything else, is the finitude of our historical experience.' (ibid 457) Indeed, the theme that 'experience is experience of human finitude' (so much so that real experience is defined as 'that whereby man becomes aware of his finiteness') is one he often repeats. Moreover, when he writes that 'the truly experienced person is one who has taken this to heart, who knows that he is master neither of time nor the future,' this reveals the basis for the finitude of all phenomena: since there is no exceptional point where all historical phenomena could be known, they have a fundamental dependence on temporal (but also spatial) conditions. (ibid 357) Even the fore-conception of completeness, that 'axiom of all hermeneutics,' cannot complete this series experienced in time and space. (ibid 370) But it is not so much that the series could be completed or that there is something pre-existing which evades even this fore-conception. When Gadamer speaks of our 'task to ever again decipher history's fragments of meaning, fragments which border on the dark contingency of facticity and which relentlessly advance upon the twilight into which the future of every present consciousness fades,' the use of poetic language is meant to convey the fact that the status of this series is fundamentally indefinite. (Gadamer 1990: 285–6) Historical phenomena can only be encountered one by one, as the dialectic of proceeding by way of question and answer makes clear. But that which is questioned equally has a peculiar status, for '[q]uestions always bring out the undetermined possibilities of a thing.' (Gadamer 2003: 375) That is, when a thing is questioned, it is brought into a 'state of indeterminacy,' so we must conclude that its status is not infinite but indeterminate. (ibid 363) Hence we have a new antithesis to place alongside the new thesis:

Thesis: There is no historical phenomenon that is not an object of possible experience.
Antithesis: Not-all historical phenomena are a possible object of experience.

A glance confirms that this new antinomy is homologous to the feminine set of Lacanian sexuated formulae and thus inscribes what we might call 'Gadamerian textual topology.' If this is indeed the case, so long as the precise layout of negating terms is maintained in these propositions, we could substitute into them other terms of concern to Gadamer with the result that his theoretical disposition towards them is accurately depicted. We demonstrate this below with respect to his understanding of language. But staying with the above propositions for the moment, we can easily demonstrate our additional claim that by keeping both these propositions in mind while reading his texts, one does not so much resolve as better appreciate the inconsistent nature of his line of thinking. For if only those arguments leading to the thetic proposition (which states that there is no limit to historical phenomenon) were considered without also keeping the antithetical proposition in mind, we might be given to believe Gadamer holds tradition to be limitless. But as '[t]radition exists only in constantly becoming other than it is,' clearly this is not the case. (Gadamer 1990: 288) Alternatively, if we held in mind only the antithetical claim that Not-all of tradition can be experienced, we might mistakenly think this implies that at least one historical phenomenon cannot be known. But again this is not the case. When Gadamer argues that the human sciences cannot be understood as teleologically pursuing the object of tradition, he explains this is so because '[s]uch an "object in itself" clearly does not exist at all.' (Gadamer 2003: 285) He concludes that the 'historical human sciences found their direction as a reaction to [the] rupture of tradition,' the very rupture inscribed in the new antinomy proposed above.9 (Gadamer 1990: 284)

Thus both propositions must be simultaneously considered. Moreover, the precise arrangement of the negating terms is to be strictly maintained. This arrangement changes with Habermas and we will see its impact on his different understanding of similar issues. In fact, the question of whether negation can even be applied is crucial to account for their differences in general. In the case of Gadamer, we saw above how the very idea of tradition is a contradiction of reason but at the same time its existence cannot be contradicted nor confirmed by reason. So making the indefinite – not negative – judgment that 'tradition is Not-all there is' leaves open the possibility that tradition concerns an ex-sistence not locatable in experience. Gadamer thus writes in a tangential manner, seeking to gently demarcate the ontological contours of tradition whose being cannot even be counted as a noumenal thing-in-itself resistant to phenomenal approaches. This is because a lack of limit to historical phenomena means there is no possibility of judging whether any of these phenomena inform us of a reality of tradition independent of us.10 In other words, he recognizes that the positive judgment 'tradition exists' and the negative judgment 'tradition does not exist' are both equally impossible to make within a field that lacks privileged points from which to cast those judgments. Where there is no historical phenomenon that cannot be known, epistemology will always take second seat to ontology,11 so he is quite justified to defend himself against accusations that his philosophy is 'a threatening relativism.' (Gadamer 1990: 283) A closer examination of why this is the case will also help specify his notion of authority.

Žižek defines the Kantian 'transcendental' as the philosophical term for a process of inversion by which 'the subject experiences as his constitutive power the very horizon which frames his vision due to his finitude.' (Žižek 1992: 103) Specified here is the paradoxical idea of a 'finite infinity/totality' which Gadamer himself expresses in an essay on the universality of the hermeneutic problem, arguing 'that the great horizon of the past, out of which our culture and our present live, influences us in everything we want, hope for or fear in the future. History is only present to us in light of our futurity.' (Gadamer 1990: 151) If so, how this inversion of impotence (ie, being subject to the past) into a constitutive power (for future endeavors) takes place is left unclear.12 Gadamer most explicitly addresses the relation between finitude and infinity/totality in the last five paragraphs, telling us that although we live wholly within language, this in no way constitutes linguistic relativism or captivity within language. Again, he correctly see that impotence inverts into a constitutive power but fails to articulate just how this occurs so that his discussion of the formation of the universal fails to rationally persuade us. His examples of Aristotle's retreating army and the search for the 'right word' correctly reveal that the point at which the universal 'coming to a stand' arrives is indeterminate, but he leaves us with the sense that this process is rather mystical. In another essay, Gadamer specifies no limit to the scope and function of hermeneutical reflection, reiterating how, for example, the hermeneutical situation stands prior to the 'opposition and separation between the ongoing, natural "tradition" and the reflective appropriation of it,' prior to any reflective attempt to take up into consciousness our substantial relation to authority and, as Heidegger has taught, prior to the subject-object dichotomy in general. (Gadamer 1990: 286, 291) He thus calls for an 'effective reflection' in contrast to one that makes everything into an object, yet he cannot precisely account for the gap between subject-object, or the gap which separates Habermas from himself.

Overall, what Gadamer fails to make explicit is how any field characterized by the inherent tension of a finite infinity/totality must contain a paradoxical element which stands in for what eludes that field. Žižek has identified this as the Lacanian master signifier (S1), the signifier of the very lack of a signifier. (Žižek 1992: 101–2) Of course, Gadamer recognizes the lack of a limit to signifiers which says there is no signifier that does not represent the subject for another signifier. But he nevertheless overlooks how this lack itself has a signifier and thus how such an 'empty' master signifier totalizes into a consistent field of meaning the free-floating dispersion of signifiers constitutive of the symbolic order (S2). As such, the authoritative threat of castration is inoperative for his notion of language and tradition; that is, the prohibitive 'no' of a master signifier, what Lacan at one time also called the Name(or No)-of-the-Father, cannot intervene to halt the slide of signifiers and transform the linguistic universe of boundless dispersion and divisibility into an Other guaranteeing consistency. For Gadamer tradition is a consequence of the nonfunctioning of negation, so he predominately works with the logic of the symbolic order without the Other's guarantee, the S2 without S1. Hence it is entirely appropriate he conceive authority as taking the very form of tradition itself, and precisely as 'nameless.' (Gadamer 2003: 280).

As the 'essence of tradition is to exist in the medium of language,' it is only fitting that we formulate this final antinomy expressing Gadamerian feminine logic (ibid 389):

Thesis: There is no thing (in the world, in tradition...) which cannot be expressed through language.
Antithesis: Not-all (of the world, of tradition...) can be expressed through language.

The logic supporting Gadamer's notion of tradition could be extended to other objects not of our possible experience up to that most general level, the world itself. Indeed the final chapter of Truth and Method investigates 'the relation between language and world' (in a discussion which cannot but put to mind Kant's analysis of his first antinomy regarding the problematic status of the world) and there we find the term 'world' often expressed with inverted commas to underscore the problematical expression 'world in itself.' (Gadamer 2003: 443, 447) However, the above antinomy is formulated to bring out Gadamer's operative notion of language and before we turn to Habermas, a brief demonstration of its appropriateness is in order.

It should be clear from the foregoing that if there is no limit to signifiers, it is not only that the process of meaning is inexhaustible due to a fundamental homogeneity of elements such that one more signifier will always retroactively determine those previous to it; it is also necessary to presuppose a paradoxical signifier which congeals into a consistent 'meaning of one' all the other signifiers. We saw that Gadamer fails to express the latter but often articulates the former process of signification so that we could associate his hermeneutical project with 'too much meaning.' This meaning is of being and is encapsulated by his well-known maxim: 'Being that can be understood is language.' (ibid 474). How can this statement to be understood with respect to the propositions above? If recognizing how the impossibility of saying it all and the attendant experience of the inexperienceable nevertheless inverts into a constitutive power (which in Lacanian terms concerns how the speaking subject is split by the phallic function on the feminine side of the table of sexuation), then the conflict of language does not concern a failed appropriation of an externally existent reality of referents but rather shows how language is in conflict with itself. For what limits language is its lack of limit; its inherent limitation paradoxically forms the 'outside' of language. This Not-all notion of language is precisely what Lacan called lalangue, a neologism which refers to those non-communicative aspects of language which gives rise to a certain ex-sistence which haunts it internally. Here perhaps we can risk a distinction between Gadamer and Heidegger in terms of the antinomy above. Inasmuch as Gadamer follows Heidegger in transforming the hermeneutical technique into the very thing itself, both ontologize the ex-sistence of the Not-all of language and claim, as the antithesis does, that it can be expressed through language. But as Žižek points out, if 'being "is" only as understood, articulated in language,' what we get with Gadamer is a domesticated Heidegger, one 'purified of disagreeable excesses.' (Žižek 1992: 169) That is, Gadamer places far less emphasis on the failure inscribed in the thesis than Heidegger does, which states that the 'no thing' cannot be expressed through language. Indeed, 'Gadamer remains an "idealist" insofar as for him the horizon of language is "always already here," whereas Heidegger's problematic of the difference [Unter-Schied] as pain [Schemerz] that inheres in the very essence of our dwelling in language, "obscurantist" as it may sound, points towards the materialist problematic of the traumatic cut, "castration," that marks our entry into language.' (Žižek 2005: 190) We will now cross the inexpressible gap separating Gadamer from Habermas to delineate the topological space of Critical Theory.

Other Lacanian Texts

Lacanian-themed puzzles