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Freedom qua Spontaneity:

The Lacanian Subject in the Critique of Pure Reason

WILLIAM J. URBAN

Heidegger and the ‘root of the two stems’

In a footnote in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger writes that ‘[o]nly by means of a clear separation between a synopsis of pure intuition and the synthesis of the understanding is the difference between “form of intuition” and “formal intuition” to be elucidated’ and he goes on to reference the same footnote of the Critique that for Allison was the key to his interpretive analysis. (Heidegger 1997: 102n.203) This lends further proof that Allison, most likely unknowingly, holds an A-Deduction view of the synthesis of imagination. Whatever the case, our examination of the B-Deduction should, at the very least, leave us with the clear appreciation that there are separate syntheses to consider in apperception and in imagination. Since spontaneity is considered to go hand in hand with synthetic activity for both Allison and Heidegger, we would do well now to enquire as to which synthesis is primary so as to better locate the point of spontaneity for the transcendental subject of apperception.

In §10 (which is the same in the A- and B-editions) and just before providing us the ‘metaphysical deduction’ of the table of categories derived from the logical forms in the preceding table of judgments, Kant provides us with a bird’s eye view of the entire process of synthesis, from the given manifold to cognition proper. He first begins with a definition of ‘synthesis in the most general sense’ as the ‘action of putting different representations together with each other and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition.’ [A77/B103] He then gives us a three step process, which involves a given manifold and two syntheses:

‘The first thing that must be given to us a priori for the cognition of all objects is the manifold of pure intuition; the synthesis of this manifold by means of the imagination is the second thing, but it still does not yield cognition. The concepts that give this pure synthesis unity... are the third thing necessary for cognition of an object that comes before us, and they depend on the understanding.’[A79–80/B104]

However, Kant’s other statements spoil this seemingly neat, linear progression. One the one hand, consider his characterization of the synthesis of imagination:

‘[s]ynthesis in general is… the mere effect of the imagination, of a blind though indispensable function of the soul17, without which we would have no cognition at all, but of which we are seldom even conscious. Yet to bring this synthesis to concepts is a function that pertains to the understanding, and by means of which it first provides cognition in the proper sense.’ [A78/B103]

On the other, consider his definition of the synthesis of understanding as ‘pure synthesis, generally represented, yield[ing] the pure concept of the understanding.’ [A78/B104]

At this point, we should begin to sense the ambiguity as to which of the two syntheses are to take precedence in Kant’s analysis. That is, should we place the point of primordial synthesis in the ‘mere effect of the imagination’ and consider the synthesis of the understanding a secondary intervention after the imagination has unified the manifold? Or should such figurative synthesis of imagination be viewed as the secondary, retroactive effect of the ‘pure synthesis’of the categories of the understanding, what Kant calls synthesis intellectualis? [B151] This is no trivial matter, since to answer this question allows us to better place the locus of spontaneity. As Žižek ponders,

‘is the force of imagination the impenetrable ultimate mystery of transcendental spontaneity, the root of subjectivity, the encompassing genus out of which grows understanding as its discursive cognitive specification, or is the encompassing genus understanding itself, with imagination as a kind of shadow cast retroactively by understanding on to the lower level of intuition – or, to put it in Hegelese, is the synthesis of imagination the underdeveloped ‘In-itself’ of a force posited ‘as such,’ ‘for itself,’ in Understanding?’ (Žižek 1999: 29)

Žižek immediately answers for Heidegger: the most fundamental dimension at the root of discursive understanding is the synthesis of imagination. This means that, for Heidegger at least, the primordial act of the subject’s transcendental spontaneity has more to do with the figurative, rather than with the intellectual synthesis and accordingly, a large portion of his self-entitled ‘Kantbook’ is devoted to elucidating the critical role of the transcendental synthesis of imagination. Let us examine his text more closely.

From the opening paragraph of his sustain discussion of the ‘Transcendental Power of Imagination,’ which he holds to be no less than the ‘formative center of ontological knowledge’, Heidegger characterizes that power as ‘original, pure synthesis [which] forms the essential unity of pure intuition (time) and pure thinking (apperception).’ (Heidegger 1997: 90)18 Further, he clearly speaks of this power as belonging to the faculty of intuition, so he places imagination with sensibility rather than with understanding, but at the same time characterizes it as a formative faculty not dependent on the presence of the intuitable. Hence, as a formative power, it simultaneously has a receptive ‘taking things in stride’ role in sensibility and a ‘spontaneous’ role in providing images and in this latter role lies ‘the proper essence of its structure.’ (91) What this means is that, despite its spontaneity, a quality which would ordinarily place such a power exclusively under the intellectual synthesis of understanding, the imagination plays a special, mediating role between pure intuition and apperception.

Heidegger associates the spontaneous nature of ‘imagining’ as referring to ‘all representing in the broadest sense which is not in accordance with perception’, such as ‘comparing, shaping, combining, distinguishing, and, in general, of binding-together (synthesis).’ (91) But it also retains its intuitive character as a representing of objects not present, such as visualizing what was perceived earlier, but also in a more original, ‘productive’ capacity of providing, to a more freely composed object, a ‘pure look of objectivity.’ Of course, he notes, such imagining cannot be as ‘creative’ as the intuitus originarius of intuition proper. (92) Again, what should be taken away here is the characterization of imagination as an intermediate faculty between sensibility and understanding. This makes sense once we consider the mediating role of imagination in producing a schema, which, as a formal ‘conceptualized’ intuition, is itself a mediating representation that provides the crucial link between the intellectual and the sensible. (Allison 2004: 214, 216) But perhaps more important is that the Transcendental Schematism reveals ‘in a far more original sense the “creative” essence of the power of imagination’ as this power is revealed as ‘originally pictorial in the pure image of time... not [in]need [of] an empirical intuition.’ (93) We will revisit the notion of schema when discussing Žižek’s criticism of Heidegger below. For now, let us more closely examine Heidegger’s rationale for focusing on the A-Deduction.

In the A-Deduction, Kant clearly treats the pure power of imagination as its own transcendental faculty, unveiling it in its critical role according to which it makes the essence of transcendence possible. Underlying this is Heidegger’s notion that a ‘faculty’ does not mean a ‘basic power’ of the mind, but rather means what such a thing ‘is able to do.’ (94) And what the faculty of imagination first and foremost ‘makes-possible’ is the original unification of pure intuition and pure thinking, forming the essential unity of transcendence and thus providing the basis for all knowledge a priori – a crucial Kantian concern. This faculty, however, is not simply reducible to these two pure elements, which is why Kant enumerates three elements, paradoxically placing the pure synthesis by means of the power of imagination alongside pure intuition (time) and pure apperception, granting all three the status of being a basic faculty of cognition. However, as previously noted, the essential transcendental investigation of the Critique has a bifurcated structure, reflecting the ‘two stems’ of our cognition: sensibility and understanding. As Heidegger says, the transcendental power of imagination appears to be ‘homeless’ despite its explicit status as a faculty of the mind. (95) Thus, there is a problem. We have ‘three original sources (capacities or faculties of the soul)… namely, sense, power of imagination, and apperception.’ [A94; also A115] But these three faculties stand in ‘harsh opposition’ to the two basic stems of cognition. Obviously, sense is to sensibility and apperception is to understanding. As to this third, ‘homeless’ faculty, Heidegger’s solution is to conceive the power of the imagination as the ‘unknown common root’ to these ‘two stems.’ Extending this metaphor, he implies that just as a root is hidden away from sight, likewise Kant (as already quoted above) characterizes the ‘effect of the imagination [as]… a blind though indispensable function of the soul, without which we would have no cognition at all, but of which we are seldom even conscious.’ [A78/B103] Let us specify what Heidegger means by ‘root’ more closely.

To characterize the transcendental power of imagination as a root is to say that the two stems of pure intuition and pure thinking in some way ‘grow out’ from it, lending them both ‘support and stability.’ But this is not to say that cognition is ‘merely imaginary.’ Rather, as a root, imagination can ‘imagine’ something, or form an image, ‘only in structural unity with those two [stems]’ (97) Nor is this root to be conceived as some monistic ‘basic power’ in the soul, as the ultimate ‘floor or base’ of cognition. Rather, it should be thought of as a ‘going-back into the essential origin of transcendence’ in the sense of the ‘constitution of transcendence… projected anew onto the grounds of its possibility,’ a ‘going-back’ within the dimension of a ‘making-possible.’ (98) Thus, this original unity, this pure synthetic capacity of the root, is only possible to the extent that what is to be unified (time and apperception) allows what is to be unified to ‘spring forth.’ (99) There appears to be mutual give and take between the root and the two stems, or more precisely, a self-relating aspect to this ‘going-back’ and it is in this sense that ‘spontaneity’ is to be conceived. Let us carefully examine this relation, first by examining the root as it relates to pure intuition (time), then as it does so with respect to pure thinking (apperception).

To provide a framework for his approach to the relation between imagination as root to the stem of pure intuition (time), Heidegger asks a simple question: what exactly is intuited in pure intuition? He answers that it cannot be simply the ‘form of intuition.’ Rather, it is an object of sorts, but one that cannot be intuited. It is what Kant calls ens imaginarium, a certain Nothing conceived as a Something. (101) In the Critique, it is defined as an ‘empty intuition without an object’ [A292/B348] and it is on this basis that Heidegger essentially equates pure intuition qua original ‘letting [something] spring forth’ with the pure power of imagination, since it is this power itself ‘which formatively gives looks (images) from out of itself.’ (99) This should immediately bring to mind Allison’s notion of the imagination’s ability to provide a ‘proto-conceptualization’ which provides a ‘concept’ to the indeterminate (unconceptualized) form of intuition, resulting in a ‘formal intuition’ which again, Heidegger argues, is a distinction only to be had if one clearly separates the ‘synopsis of pure intuition [here, in its essence, equated with the pure power of the imagination] and the synthesis of the understanding.’ (102n.203) In a word, at precisely the critical turning point of his analysis, Allison shows his true Heideggerian roots.

While the two approaches of Heidegger and Allison are quite similar when the task is to link pure intuition (time) to the power of imagination, they part ways when the task is to point out the origin of pure thinking (apperception). For Allison, this was relatively easy due to his formal B-Deduction assumption that a synthesis of imagination was one and the same as the synthesis to be had in the understanding. But for Heidegger and his A-Deduction focus, the power of imagination is clearly linked with sensibility, so the question becomes: how can the higher, superior faculty of the soul, namely the understanding, spring forth from the lower, inferior faculty of sensibility? He begins his answer by noting the obvious fact that both thinking and intuiting are ‘species of representing’ that fall under ‘the same genus of pre-presenting.’ (103) But more importantly, the understanding is conceived as dependent on intuition and this ‘Being-dependent’ falls within the pure synthesis of the pure power of imagination. (104) He begins to explain this by rejecting the notion that because traditional logic deals with understanding and not imagination, the former stands on its own. Rather, what we must do is focus on the characterization of thinking as essentially taking the form of judgments19, a designation of which, as a ‘faculty of rules,’ leads us to the basic determination of the understanding as pure apperception. (105) Here, Heidegger makes use of a purely logical notion of the I as pure apperception (which concurs with the Lacanian understanding of subjectivity) and the necessity of an ‘I think’ accompanying all representing. This I, he writes, is the ‘vehicle’ of the categories that allows one to say, for example, ‘I think causality’ and thus marks the fact that the pure understanding is a ‘pre-forming of the horizon of unity which represents “from out of itself.”’ Further, it is ‘a representing, forming spontaneity’ that lies in the Transcendental Schematism and here is the key link to the power of imagination, since the pure schematism is a product of that power. In this way, ‘as representing which forms spontaneously, the apparent achievement of the pure understanding in the thinking of the unities [eg ‘I think causality’] is a pure basic act of the transcendental power of imagination.’ (106) Original thinking can no longer be called judging, but is pure in the sense of ‘self-orienting [or] self-relating-to’ and further, is ‘free’ to form and conceive of something, equated as it is to pure imagining. (106)

Heidegger elucidates his examination of the imaginative character of pure thinking with a consideration of reason, since to ‘attempt... to come nearer to pure self-consciousness, to its essence, [is to] grasp it as reason.’ (106) He asks himself if this imaginative character makes sense, since reviewers tacitly assume Kant’s own supposed assumption that understanding and reason are simply identical with spontaneity. In as much as the power of imagination is the representing, free forming in pure thinking, this is not a problem. But it is considerably more difficult to profess a kinship with that power, as a faculty of intuition, in its receptive capacity. (107) How exactly could one say that understanding and reason are receptive? Heidegger answers that the essential intuitive and receptive character of pure thinking ‘come[s] out as the fundamental character of the “unity” of transcendental apperception that, constantly unifying in advance… is opposed to everything random.’ And further, ‘the rules of binding together (synthesis) are represented precisely as binding in their character as binding-together.’ (108) These statements and others in Heidegger’s text seems to suggest a similarity to Allison’s ‘controversial’ defense of Kant’s claim (stated above) that the synthesis to be had at the level of the understanding falls under an analytic principle. But with Heidegger, there is a new twist. Not only must this principle assume a numerically identical subject throughout the spontaneous, synthetic activity (as per Allison’s argument), but such a subject is, at the same, paradoxically receptive. Or in Heidegger’s terms, there is a ‘free, formative projecting of the affinity’ which is in-itself a representing that ‘submits’ and ‘takes things in stride.’20 Pure thinking is thus a pure intuition that is a ‘structural, coherent, receptive spontaneity [that] must spring forth from the transcendental power of imagination in order to be able to be what it is.’ (108) He concludes in characterizing understanding and reason as ‘free’ not because of their characterization as spontaneous, but because this spontaneity is a ‘receptive spontaneity, ie, because it is the transcendental power of imagination.’ (109)

We thus reach a key motif in Heidegger’s reading of Kant’s philosophy, that of conceiving the finitude of the subject as constitutive of its freedom. Heidegger is able to do so by conceiving both stems pure intuition and pure thinking as rooted in the transcendental power of the imagination, a power that ‘reveals itself more and more as structural possibility, ie, in its making-possible of transcendence as the essence of the finite self.’ (109) In this way, it is an invisible power hidden away from sight, of which we are ‘seldom even conscious.’ Having lost the character of an empirical faculty of the soul, it is understandable that it is not reflected in the bifurcated structure of the transcendental investigation even in the A-Edition. But another account must be made as to why Kant engaged in a ‘shrinking back’ from this power in the B-Deduction after its initial establishment as the essential faculty in the Critique.

In direct contrast to the claim noted above, Heidegger argues that both Deductions are ‘objective’ as well as ‘subjective,’ and that if anything, the B-Deduction is more ‘psychological’ because it is more exclusively oriented with respect to pure reason as such. (119) To understand this, we need to appreciate that for Heidegger, the Transcendental Deduction in both versions is ‘necessarily objective-subjective at the same time’ as it seeks to ‘unveil… the horizon of objectivity’ which ‘takes place in the pure subject as such.’ (116) Thus we see Kant engaged in an unveiling of transcendence that is inseparable with respect to finite subjectivity and the B-Deduction, from its very first pages, is explicitly engaged with a sustained analysis of such a transcendental subject (of apperception) that much more exclusively orients itself with respect to pure reason. Yet at the same time, this approach veils ‘the line of vision into the more original essence of the transcendental power of imagination’ as a base faculty within sensibility. (119) Heidegger believes this occurred because ‘pure reason as reason drew [Kant] increasingly under its spell’ between the two editions of the Critique. Kant’s growing pre-occupation with purifying his philosophy, of seeking to attribute ‘[a]ll pure synthesis and synthesis in general... as spontaneity... to the faculty which in a proper sense is free, the acting reason,’ was coupled with a fear of the abyss which he himself had brought the ‘possibility of metaphysics’ toward. With this new emphasis on the primacy of Logic, he simply could not bring himself to ground Ratio and Logos in the power of the imagination and thus sought to emphasize ‘the rational character of pure knowledge and of action’, since the ‘essence of subjectivity of the subject lies in its personality... synonymous with moral reason.’ From this point forward, the transcendental essence of human finitude is no longer to be determined through sensibility. Kant now searches for finitude in the ‘pure, rational creature itself.’ (118) Since the transcendental power of imagination could not be conceived as ‘solid enough to determine originally... [and] precisely the finite essence of the subjectivity of the human subject,’ that power was ‘thrust aside’ in the B-Deduction. (120, 113)

Heidegger, however, insists that ‘to human finitude belongs sensibility,’ that ‘human pure reason is necessarily a pure sensible reason,’ and that ‘the transcendental power of imagination is the original ground for the possibility of human subjectivity.’21 (121) Through a close reading of the A-Deduction, Heidegger attempts to reveal the grounding aspect this power of imagination has on human reason, as we would expect him to do, since ‘the Critique of Pure Reason... is from the beginning and solely a matter of human pure reason.’ (120) He does this through a discussion of the role of temporality in pure synthesis as laid out in the three sections of the A-Deduction, concluding with a discussion of the relation between time and the self, the logical I of pure apperception. Therefore, just as we examined the appropriate section of the B-Deduction with Allison, we now turn to a discussion of the A-Deduction with Heidegger.

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